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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
PERPETUITIES-WILL BEQUEATHING AND DEVISING PROPERTY IN TRUST TO
COMMENCE UPON TERMINATION OF ADMINISTRATION-NOT INVALID UNDER
RULE AGAINST PERPE~TEs.-Testator by his will left his residuary estate
to his son, "in trust, however, upon the following uses, trusts, and condi-
tions, that is to say: (a) This trust is to commence immediately upon the
termination of the administration of my estate. . . This trust is to con-
tinue for a period of twenty years from its beginning." In order to up-
hold this will, the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted this clause as
creating a trust which commenced at the death of the testator and lasted
for twenty years from that time, although the trustees were to have no
active duties until the end of the period of administration. The Court
considered this construction necessary to avoid the rule against per-
petuities since it would otherwise be uncertain whether the trust must
arise within the period of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and
also since the trust probably would not terminate within such a period,
because the process of administration would necessarily take a year or
more. Trautz v. Lemp (Mo. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 135.
In construing similar provisions the courts generally reach the same re-
sult, but their reasons are to some extent different, although still involving
the rule against perpetuities. They are concerned solely with the possi-
bility that the administration of the estate may extend beyond the period
of a life or lives in being and twenty-one years allowed by the rule. To
avoid this fatal possibility, and based upon the presumption that the tes-
tator knew the law, it is normally held that the trust becomes vested at
once, although the trustees have no immediate right to the trust assets.
Canda v. Canda (1921) 92 N. J. Eq. 423; 112 Atl. 727; and ef. note (1921)
13 A. L. R. 1033. Obviously this presumption is false, for if the testator
or his lawyer knew the law, he would not use language which in its literal
meaning is contrary to it, and so probably force a lawsuit over the will.
However, it would seem that the result is socially desirable in that it up-
holds, as near as may be, the testator's wishes and obviates the evils
against which the rule is aimed.
Trusts established for the benefit of public charities are not in any way
subject to the rule against perpetuities. Christ's Hospital v. Grainger
(1848) 1 Macn. & G. 460, 41 Eng. Repr. 1343; Chambers v. City of St. Louis
(1860) 29 Mo. 543 (attempt to break the Mullanphy Emigrant Aid Trust).
The legal fights to establish whether or not a particular trust is charitable
or not have tended to obscure from view the well-settled principle that if
the trust begins within a proper time and has only beneficiaries whose
interests vest within a period which satisfies the rule against perpetuities,
then the trust may last for an indefinite period regardless of this rule.
Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1917) 271 Mo. 669, 197 S. W. 261; Plum-
mer v. Roberts (1926) 315 Mo. 627, 287 S. W. 316; Nicol v. Morton (1928)
332 Ill. 533, 164 N. E. 5; and GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed.
1915) secs. 235-245b. Missouri has recanted its earlier heresy that a
failure to give a right of possession within the period was as fatal as a
failure to vest a right within this period. Lockbridge v. Mace (1892) 109
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Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145; overruled in Gates v. Seibert (1900) 157 Mo. 254,
57 S. W. 1065. The question whether the interests of the beneficiaries of
a trust are sufficiently vested or not is determined by the same rules that
apply in considering the rights of holders or prospective holders of legal
titles. Gray, op. cit. sec. 413. An indestructible trust which may last
more than a life or lives in being and twenty-one years after the entire
equitable interest under it has become indefeasibly vested is void. Fitchie
v. Brown (1906) 211 U. S. 321; Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown (1926) 105
Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555. The better view seems to be that this result is
based upon a special rule formed by analogy to the rule against perpetuities
rather than upon the rule itself. Gray, op. cit. sec. 1211; KALEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS sec. 658; and cf. Armstrong v. Barber (1909) 239 Ill. 389, 88
N. E. 246. The practical result of these cases is to throw into sharp re-
lief the great legal and practical differences between an indefeasibly vested
estate and an estate which is vested subject to being divested, although
both of these satisfy the rule, while the latter's closer analogy, an estate
whose vesting depends upon an indefinite contingency, does not.
There are two special types of trusts which frequently come into con-
flict with the rule against perpetuities. The spendthrift trust is obviously
a violation of the rule if it is to last for more than a life in being and
twenty-one years, because the beneficiary does not secure a vested interest
until the principal or income is actually paid over to him. Loud v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. (1922) 298 Mo. 148, 249 S. W. 629. A trust which
provides that all or part of the income shall be allowed to accumulate for a
certain period is not rendered void by the length of this period alone.
Thellusson v. Woodford (1805) 11 Vesey 112, 32 Eng. Repr. 1030; Gold-
tree v. Thompson (1889) 79 Cal. 613, 22 Pac. 50; and cf. Lane v. Garrison
(1922) 293 Mo. 530, 239 S. W. 813. Influenced by the undesirability of
starving the present generation to accumulate unbounded luxuries for the
future, England early passed a statute narrowly limiting this practice.
(1800) 39 and 40 George III, c. 98. This has been copied in several Ameri-
can states, with varying modifications, but the Missouri legislature has
never seen fit to adopt such a measure, perhaps because no case has as
yet arisen in this state bringing the possible evils into striking prominence.
R. S. Ill. (Cahill, 1931) ch. 3 sec. 145; C. S. N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) ch. 42
sec. 16; Vierling, The Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts (1924)
9 ST. Lojis L. R.v. 286. G. W. S., '33.
POuCE POwER-EXERCISE FOR AESTHETIC PURPoSE-EREmOoN OF
SCREEN BY STATE To HIDE SIGN FROM MOTORISTS' VIE.-The state highway
department erected a screen in front of plaintiff's property so that motor-
ists would not see a sign on plaintiff's property. Held, such action could be
enjoined as a deprivation of property rights. The court, in its opinion, ob-
served: "The original motive in erecting the screen was purely aesthet-
ic. . . It is contended that under the police power of the state this
screen may be erected. Courts have gone far in upholding the police power,
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